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Abstract
In this paper we examine the optimal policies for sin goods and health care in a
two-period economy. Individuals are myopic in the sense that they undervalue the
utilities of future consumption and health quality. When investing in health care
in the second period, individuals who have previously made myopic decisions may
persist in their shortsighted consumption plans (persistent error) or recognize their
mistakes (dual self). We show that, for persistent-error myopes, the rst-best policy
mix requires a subsidy on savings and a tax on sin goods. The health care should
be taxed (subsidized) if the degree of myopia concerning future consumption is larger
(smaller) than that concerning health quality. For dual-self myopes, the optimal policy
for sin goods can be either a tax or a subsidy, depending on the relative degrees of
myopia and the property of the health quality function.
Keywords: sin goods; health care; myopic behaviors
JEL classication: H21; I18
1 Introduction
Sin goods refer to those commodities that bring immediate gratication but at the cost of
detrimental e¤ects on future health. Common examples include alcohol, cigarettes, drugs,
and junk foods. These goods are more or less regulated by countries the world over, jus-
tied by at least the following two rationales. First, sin goods usually involve negative
externalities, such as alcohol-related violence and passive smoking. Second, sin goods are
often immoderately consumed due to individualsself-control or myopia problems, i.e., the
problem of lacking the ability to fully recognize the delayed health costs.
In this study we concern how to regulate sin goods with the primary focus being on the
second justication. The issue has been studied by ODonoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006),
who develop a comprehensive framework amenable to addressing optimal sin taxes that is
characterized by population heterogeneity in self-control problems. These and many subse-
quent studies generally model self-control or myopia problems based on individuals who are
shortsighted so that they undervalue the negative e¤ects of sin goods on future health.1 How-
ever, myopia can refer not only to shortsightedness regarding future health consequences. In
the literature on social security, myopic individuals are often regarded as those who attach
too little weight to the utility of future consumption (Feldstein, 1985). This kind of myopia
problem has yet received little attention in the literature on optimal sin taxes. Given that
shortsightedness is undoubtedly an important feature of the sin-good consumers, it seems
reasonable to extend the debate to encompass individuals with multiple types of shortsight-
edness. This is what we attempt to do in this paper.
For that purpose, we borrow the two-period model of sin taxes from Cremer et al. (2012).
Their study adds two interesting traits to the issue of sin taxes. First, they assume that
individuals can invest in health care in the second period to mitigate the damage caused
by sin-good consumption in the rst period. Second, while investing in health care, indi-
viduals who have made shortsighted choices of sin-good consumption earlier may persist in
their mistaken consumption plans or acknowledge their mistakes. Myopia in their model is
primarily associated with future health quality. We extend their work by considering that
individuals are myopic not only in terms of future health quality but also in terms of the
utility of future consumption.
1Although both are features of sin-good consumers, self-control problems and myopia are not equivalent
in concept. The existing literature takes quite di¤erent approaches on them. For the former, consumers with
self-control problems have di¢ culty of reducing addictive sin-good consumption (e.g., quitting smoking).
Thus, precommitmentis a solution to constrain the later self to follow the plans favored by an earlier self
(Gruber and K½oszegi, 2001). For the latter, in contrast, myopic consumers (with dual self) have problems
measuring future benets and costs. Thus, it requires that the early selfs decisions being corrected to
conform with the preferences of the later self (Cremer et al., 2012).
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The key assumption of this analysis is that people have di¤erent subjective discount
rates on di¤erent goods (i.e., consumption and health). This assumption is well supported
by the empirical literature. Many studies have identied that discount rates do vary accross
commodities. Most related to our paper is the stream of works that estimates the discount
rates on health and money (see, e.g., Cairns, 1992; Chapman and Elstein, 1995; Baker
et al., 2003).2 These studies identify that people discount health and money at di¤erent
rates, but results regarding which discount rate is higher are mixed; namely, money can
be discounted at a higher or lower rate than health, depending on other factors considered
in the experiments. More recently, Bickel et al. (2011) analyze intertemporal choices of
two commodities, cocaine and money, and nd that di¤erent menus of commodities lead to
various discounting rates. Using a much broader set of commodities, Ubfal (2016) also nds
that people are singnicantly more impatient about some goods and less impatient about the
others. Our appraoch assuming that people have di¤erent degrees of myopia is in accordance
with these empirical observations.
We focus on the optimal policies that decentralize the rst-best allocations. For persistent-
error myopes (those who stick to their mistaken consumption plans), the optimal policy mix
requires a subsidy on savings and a tax on sin goods. As for health care, we nd that if
the degree of myopia concerning health quality is stronger than that concerning future con-
sumption, health care investment should be subsidized as illustrated by Cremer et al. (2012).
However, in particular, if the degree of myopia concerning future consumption is stronger,
it may be necessary to tax health care. To state this intuitively, when myopia concerning
future consumption is stronger, persistent-error individuals underestimate the utility of their
second-period consumption more severely than underestimating the utility of health care.
As a result, they will under-consume the commodity and over-invest in health care, which
calls for a tax on health care to balance it.
For dual-self myopes (those who in the second period will regret their earlier myopic
behavior), no treatment on health care is needed because these myopes will adjust their
behavior to make the right decision on health investment. The optimal sin tax can be
positive or negative, which depends upon the relative degrees of myopia and upon how sin
goods and health care interact in the health quality function. Specically, a negative sin tax
may be favorable if (i) the degree of myopia concerning health quality is greater, together
with the sin goods and health care being complements; or (ii) the degree of myopia concerning
future consumption is greater, together with the sin goods and health care being substitutes.
Intuitively, if myopia in relation to health quality is stronger, individuals will tend to plan
2In our model, discounting future consumption is similar to discounting future money, since future money
is spent on consuming a single numeraire good.
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a suboptimally low level of health investment in the rst period (a plan they will not obey
in the second period). At the same time, with this planned level they will tend to choose
a too lowamount of sin-good consumption, supposing that sin goods and health care are
complements. If this e¤ect is very strong, sin goods will be under-consumed instead of being
over-consumed. This provides a reasoning for subsidizing sin goods.
Given that our model is essentially a generalization of the work by Cremer et al. (2012),
it is worthwhile to briey summarize the similarities and di¤erences between our results and
their ndings. For persistent-error myopes, both papers indicate that sin goods should be
taxed at a positive rate. However, in their paper it is optimal to subsidize health care, while
our analysis nds that the rst-best policy for health care can be either a tax or a subsidy. In
addition, they show that savings should be untaxed, whereas in our paper it is necessary to
subsidize savings due to myopia concerning future health. For dual-self myopes, both papers
suggest that health care should be untaxed. Nonetheless, their paper proposes a positive sin
tax, while our analysis shows that, under certain conditions, it may be optimal to subsidize
sin goods.
1.1 Related Literature
Our study belongs to the literature on optimal sin taxes. Gruber and K½oszegi (2001) establish
a rational addictionmodel to study the regulation on addictive bads for time-inconsistent
agents, and use the model to quantify the optimal taxation on cigarettes. The tax incidence
of cigarette taxation among di¤erent income groups is examined later in Gruber and K½oszegi
(2004). ODonoghue and Rabin (2003, 2006) study optimal sin taxes when individuals are
heterogeneous in self-control problems. They demonstrate that a (positive) sin tax can be
Pareto-improving as it achieves the goals of redistribution and correcting the self-control
problems. Aronsson and Thunstr½om (2008) assume that the instantaneous utility from sin
goods not only depends on current consumption but also on the stock of health capital, which
is negatively related to the accumulated consumption of unhealthy goods. Within such a
setting, they show that the optimal policy would be a subsidy for health capital, while no
tax on sin goods is needed. Yaniv et al. (2009) address the obesity problem. They nd
that a tax on junk-foods, known as the fat tax, will unambiguously reduce obesity, while
a thin subsidyfor healthy foods may lead to an increase in obesity. By using a political
framework where individuals vote on the determination of sin taxes, Haavio and Kotakorpi
(2011) compare the equilibrium tax rate with the socially optimal level.
Two recent papers that introduce the issue of regret into the literature are closely related
to the present paper. Cremer et al. (2012) consider one type of consumers who regret
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their past consumption plans (dual-self) and the other type of consumers who never regret
them (persistent-error). They also introduce the role of health investment that can mitigate
the damage caused by sin goods. Absent from health expenditures, Pestieau and Ponthiere
(2012) consider three types of consumers: type-1 agents who are farsighted; type-2 agents
who are myopes with dual selves; type-3 agents who are impatient and simply forego the
future. Both studies provide important insights in regard to the interplay between regret
behaviors and optimal sin taxes. None of the aforementioned studies, however, distinguishes
between myopia concerning the harmful e¤ect of sin goods and myopia regarding the utility
of future consumption. This present paper thus contributes to the literature by showing that
the relative degrees of the two types of myopia play a relevant role in the design of optimal
policies on sin goods and health care.
The myopic behaviors under consideration are also related to the literature on social se-
curity with myopic agents.3 Some of the contributions consider myopic agents as those who
forego the future and thus do not save at all (e.g., Feldstein, 1985; Docquier, 2002; Cremer
et al., 2007, 2008), while others allow individuals to be characterized by a partial myopia
which leads to positive but inadequate savings (e.g., Feldstein, 1985; Cremer et al., 2009,
Andersen and Bhattacharya, 2011). Another group of papers, including Pecchenino and Pol-
lard (2005), Findley and Caliendo (2009), Caliendo (2011), and Caliendo and Gahramanov
(2013), model myopic individuals as those who in facing uncertainty cannot perfectly foresee
the length of their lifetime. Our analysis adopts the second approach involving partially
myopic individuals for the convenience of examining the interaction between second-period
consumption and health investment.
Finally, some of our results are in accord with those in Pestieau et al. (2008) and Leroux et
al. (2011), who examine whether the government should subsidize health spending, and nd
that under certain conditions it may be optimal to tax health spending instead of subsidizing
it. In these papers, however, the issue of sin goods is absent, and health investment a¤ects
welfare by enhancing longevity, while in our present paper health investment is used to
mitigate the negative e¤ects of unhealthy goods.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model and char-
acterizes the rst-best optimum. Section 3 and Section 4, respectively, examine the optimal
policies for individuals with persistent errors and with dual selves. Section 5 compares the
optimal sin taxes under the two cases. Section 6 concludes the paper.
3See Cremer and Pestieau (2011) for a recent survey.
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2 The Model
We use a simplied version of the Cremer et al. (2012) model and extend it to additionally
consider the myopia that is concerned with the utility of future consumption. Our model is
kept as close to that of Cremer et al. (2012) as possible in order to highlight the pure e¤ect
of introducing the myopia regarding future consumption. The economy is inhabited by a
number of individuals who are homogeneous except in regard to their types of myopia (to be
described later).4 Each individual lives for two periods. In the rst period, he allocates an
exogenous income y among the current consumption of a numeraire good c, the consumption
of a sin good x, and savings s for future expenses. Consuming sin goods brings immediate
utility, but at the cost of a delayed negative e¤ect on health. In the second period, he
consumes the numeraire good at the level d, and also invests e to improve his health quality.
The individuals truewelfare is given by:
W = u(c) + v(x) + [u(d) + h(x; e)]; (1)
where u(c) and v(x) are strictly concave in c and x, and  is the true discount factor that
individuals will actually experience in the second period.5 The function h(x; e) reects the
individuals state of health quality that is decreasing in sin goods consumed and increasing
in the health investment, i.e., @h=@x < 0 and @h=@e > 0. We also assume that h(x; e) is
strictly concave in e. In the absence of policy intervention, the budget constraints are:
y = c+ x+ s; (2)
s = d+ e: (3)
Note that in (3) a zero interest rate is assumed for simplicity.
2.1 The rst-best optimum
As in Cremer et al. (2012), we rst characterize the optimal allocations that are chosen by
a paternalistic social planner, who maximizes (1) subject to (2) and (3). This yields the
4We do not consider heterogeneous earnings for simplicity. The rst-best allocations are identical for all
regardless of whether earnings di¤er across individuals or not if we adopt a uniform true discount factor. But
the rst-best allocation is not attainable with a common tax rate levied on all consumers. See the discussion
in Cremer et al. (2012).
5For simplicity we assume a uniform discount factor. All of our results are robust to a more general setting
under which the true discount factors for second-period consumption and for health quality are di¤erent.
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following Lagrangian function:
L = u(c) + v(x) + u(d) + h(x; e) + (y   c  x  d  e); (4)
where  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the resource constraints.
The optimal conditions for this problem are easily derived as:
u0(c) =  (5a)
v0(x) =  @h(x; e)
@x
+  (5b)
u0(d) =  (5c)

@h
@e
(x; e) = : (5d)
The social planner equalizes the discounted marginal utilities (the left-hand sides) to the
marginal costs in terms of utility (the right-hand sides). The set of equations (5a)-(5d)
determines the rst-best allocations (denoted by ) c, x, d, e, and s(= d + e).
2.2 Decentralized economy with myopic individuals
In this subsection we describe the decentralized decision-making by myopic individuals, who
are shortsighted in the following two facets. First, as proposed by Cremer et al. (2012), they
may undervalue the importance of their health quality in the second period. Secondly, they
may also undervalue the utility of future consumption (Feldstein, 1985; Cremer et al., 2009;
Cremer and Pestieau, 2011; Andersen and Bhattacharya, 2011). We allow both types of
myopia as well as their degrees to be di¤erent across individuals. We also follow Cremer et
al. (2012) to contrast two personal characteristics: persistent errorand dual self. Now
let us introduce each of them in detail.
2.2.1 Persistent error
The characteristic persistent error refers to the case where myopic individuals make all
decisions in the rst period according to their shortsighted preferences, and in the second
period they stick to their incorrect consumption plans. The objective functions with which
they make decisions are:
Ui = u(ci) + v(xi) + 
C
i u(di) + 
H
i h(xi; ei); (6)
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where subscript i indexes the types of individuals (classied by their degrees of myopia). The
parameter Ci 2 (0; ] is the degree of myopia concerning the second-period consumption,
and Hi 2 (0; ] is the degree of myopia concerning the health quality.6
The government imposes taxes/subsidies on individuals in order to correct the problems
of myopia. Let  s, x, and  e denote the tax rates (subsidy rates in negative cases) levied on
savings, sin goods, and health expenditure, respectively. Accordingly, the budget constraints
can be written as:
y + ai = (1 +  s;i)si + (1 + x;i)xi + ci; (7)
si = di + (1 +  e;i)ei: (8)
where ai is a lump-sum transfer.
For myopes with persistent errors, all decisions are made at the start of the rst period
and remain unchanged afterwards. They maximize (6) subject to (7) and (8), which yields
the following rst-order conditions:
u0(ci) = 
P
i ; (9a)
v0(xi) =  Hi
@h
@x
(xi; ei) + (1 + x;i)
P
i ; (9b)
Ci u
0(di) = (1 +  s;i)
P
i ; (9c)
Hi
@h
@e
(xi; ei) = (1 +  s;i)(1 +  e;i)
P
i ; (9d)
where Pi is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the individuals budget constraints,
and the superscript P denotes the case of persistent error. Again, the left-hand sides of
equations (9a)-(9d) are marginal utilities and the right-hand sides are marginal costs in
terms of utility with respect to ci, xi, di, and ei. Notice that if the degrees of myopia are the
same among individuals, Ci = 
C and Hi = 
H , then the decentralized allocations are also
identical for all individuals.
2.2.2 Dual self
Alternatively, individuals behaving as dual selveswill recognize their previous mistakes
when they choose how much to invest in health quality. In other words, they make myopic
health-care plans in the rst period, but later in the second period they will make the correct
6We have mentioned that myopic individuals are sometimes modeled as those who totally forego the
future, which means that Ci and 
H
i are equal to zero. In this case, however, it is not possible to invest
in health care and thus the rst-best optimum is unreachable. Our analysis omits this case given that our
main focus is on the rst-best policies.
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health-care decisions according to the true discount factor.7
In the rst period, the myopic selfmakes his consumption plans using the shortsighted
preference. The rst-order conditions are similar as in the case of persistent error:
u0(ci) = 
D
i ; (10a)
v0(xi) =  Hi
@h
@x
(xi; e
m
i ) + (1 + x;i)
D
i ; (10b)
Ci u
0[si   (1 +  e;i)emi ] = (1 +  s;i)Di ; (10c)
Hi
@h
@e
(xi; e
m
i ) = (1 +  s;i)(1 +  e;i)
D
i : (10d)
Here, Di is the Lagrangian multiplier with the superscript D denoting the case of the dual
self. emi denotes the health expenditures originally planned in the rst period.
Equations (10a)-(10d) determine the levels of ci, xi, and si, but not the level of ei. This
is because (10d) is the rst-order condition with which the myopic selfmade the incorrect
health investment in the rst period. However, in the second period, the rational self
appears. The rational selves realize that they have made a mistake earlier, so that they
will no longer choose the level emi now. Instead, they alter the health investment choice
and redecide it according to the true welfare. The optimization condition for health care
becomes:
(1 +  e;i)u
0[si   (1 +  e;i)ei] = @h
@e
(xi; ei): (11)
By inserting the levels of ci, xi, and si derived in the rst period into (11), we can then
obtain the nal choices ei and di made by the rational self in the second period.
3 Optimal Policies with Persistent Errors
We are now ready to investigate the optimal policies. In this section we study the case of
persistent errors. We will demonstrate that the rst-best allocations can be decentralized
with an individualized policy mix. By comparing equations (5a)-(5d) with equations (9a)-
(9d), we can obtain the optimal policies, which are elucidated by the following lemma:
Lemma 1 In the case of persistent errors, an optimal policy mix that decentralizes the rst-
7ODonoghue and Rabin (1999) separate dual-self individuals into two types: naive people (i.e., those
who do not foresee that they will have self-control problems in the future) and sophisticated people (i.e.,
those who can foresee their self-control problems). In our dual-self model, individuals behave more like the
case of naivete.
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best allocations is given by:
Ps;i =
Ci   

; (12a)
Px;i =
Hi   
u0(ci)
@h
@x
(x; e); (12b)
Pe;i =
Hi   Ci
Ci
: (12c)
Proof. Letting Pi =  and by comparing equations (5a)-(5d) with equations (9a)-(9d)
complete the proof.
Obviously, without any myopia problems, i.e., Ci = 
H
i = , there is no reason for the
government to intervene in the economy. Therefore, in this case all tax rates are equal to
zero. As for those who are shortsighted only in health quality, i.e., Hi < 
C
i = , which is the
scenario considered in Cremer et al. (2012), the optimal policy mix requires Ps;i = 0, 
P
x;i > 0,
and Pe;i < 0. This result is quite intuitive. Myopia in relation to health quality induces
two distortions: underestimating the damage caused by sin goods and underestimating the
benet of health investment. To correct both distortions, the government should tax sin
goods and subsidize health care. The savings decision-making, by contrast, is not distorted
in the absence of the type of myopia concerning future consumption, so that the government
should simply leave savings uninuenced.
Now we discuss the policy implications arising from the inclusive case where individuals
are myopic in both health quality and future consumption, i.e., Hi ; 
C
i < . First, individu-
als subject to myopia regarding future consumption do not save enough to provide for their
old age. Thus, savings should be subsidized. Secondly, sin goods should be taxed regardless
of the extent of Ci , as long as myopia concerning health quality is present. Thirdly, perhaps
interestingly, when individuals su¤er more from the myopia problem regarding future con-
sumption than health quality, i.e., Ci < 
H
i , to reach the rst-best optimum, it is required
that the government taxes health care rather than subsidizes it. The underlying intuition
can be explained as follows. Suppose that the level of savings has been corrected to its
optimal level since the government adopts policy Ps;i. This means that the individual has
taken an optimal amount of resources to the second period, i.e., si = s. Accordingly, the
target of the tax on health expenditures is then to equalize the marginal utility of second-
period consumption with the marginal utility of health investment. In the previous case
where Hi < 
C
i = , only the marginal utility of health care is undervalued; therefore the
government should adopt a subsidy policy to correct it. On the contrary, if Ci < 
H
i , the
marginal utility of second-period consumption is undervalued even more than the marginal
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utility of health care. In this case, as a result, the optimal policy mix entails taxing the
health investment. Finally, it is also straightforward to see that, with an identical degree of
myopia being attached to the whole of the second period, i.e., Ci = 
H
i , neither a tax nor a
subsidy on health investment is needed.
We outline the above discussions by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 With persistent errors, and in the presence of both myopia concerning health
care and future consumption, the optimal policy mix to reach the rst-best optimum requires
a subsidy on savings and a tax on sin goods. In particular, the optimal tax on health care is
positive (negative) if Hi > 
C
i (
H
i < 
C
i ).
Proof. A direct result from Lemma 1.
To sum up, there are three distortions in this economy: myopia regarding health quality
distorts the choices on (i) sin goods and (ii) health investment, and myopia regarding fu-
ture consumption distorts the choice on (iii) savings (or equivalently, on the second-period
consumption). For persistent-error myopes, it is necessary to correct for these distortions
with three policy instruments: by taxing sin goods, taxing/subsidizing health care, and
subsidizing savings.
By contrast, for dual-self myopes, since distortion (ii) will be corrected by their rational
selves, only two policy instruments are required to achieve the social optimum, which we
will illustrate in the next section.
4 Optimal Policies with Dual Selves
In this section we go further to study the optimal policies for myopes with dual selves. As
mentioned above, the rational selveswill amend their own health-care choices in the second
period. Accordingly, the main objective of the policy-maker is to correct the decisions made
by the myopic selves in the rst period, which are determined by equations (10a)-(10c).
By comparing equations (10a)-(10c) with (5a)-(5c), we show that the rst-best optimum can
be attained by implementing a policy mix reported by the following lemma:
Lemma 2 In the case of dual selves, an optimal policy mix that decentralizes the rst-best
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allocations is given by:
Ds;i =
Ci u
0(s   emi )  u0(s   ei )
u0(c)
; (13a)
Dx;i =
Hi
@h
@x
(x; emi )   @h@x(x; e)
u0(c)
; (13b)
De;i = 0: (13c)
Proof. Inserting Di = , 
D
e;i = 0, and comparing equations (5a)-(5c) with equations
(10a)-(10c) complete the proof.
In Lemma 2 we denote emi as the level of health investment planned by the myopic self
with the presence of rst-best policies in the rst period. Notice that emi is not equivalent
to e unless in a special case (which we will detail later). Analogous to Cremer et al. (2012),
the optimal policy for myopes with dual selves is neither to tax nor to subsidize health care.
The intuition is that individuals with dual selves are capable of making the optimal health-
care decision as long as they take a correct amount of savings to the second period. In other
words, once other policies can successfully induce individuals to save correctly, no further
treatment on health care is needed.
Before examining the optimal policy for sin goods, it is useful to rst compare the levels of
emi with e
. The following lemma reports the relationship between myopia and the relative
magnitude of emi and e
.
Lemma 3 For dual-self myopes, we have:
emi R e if Hi R Ci : (14)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition is clear. If dual-self individuals su¤er more from the myopic problem re-
garding future consumption than health quality, i.e., Hi > 
C
i , the myopic selves undervalue
the marginal utility of second-period consumption more than the marginal utility of health
care. Therefore, in the rst period, they will choose a higher amount of health investment
than that amended by their rational selves in the second period. The opposite case Hi < 
C
i
follows a similar interpretation.
We are now in a position to deal with optimal sin taxes. An insightful understanding from
Cremer et al. (2012) is that the property of the health quality function plays an important
role in the design of optimal sin taxes. According to the nature of the sin goods, the health
quality function can exhibit di¤erent properties. The property @2h=@x@e > 0 refers to the
case where the marginal benet of health care increases with the consumption of sin goods.
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Sin goods of this type can be thought of as fatty foods. When you consume more fatty foods,
you are more likely to develop diabetes or hypertension. In this case, the modern medicine
capable of dealing with these diseases becomes more helpful to you. On the contrary, the
property @2h=@x@e < 0 refers to the situation where the benet of health care diminishes as
more sin goods are consumed. An example of this type of sin goods is the cigarette. Smoking
heavily will increase the risk of getting lung cancer and trachea cancer. For cancer patients,
it is di¢ cult to obtain much utility from consuming health care given that modern medicine
could only help them in very limited ways. In other words, the marginal benet of health
care can be small for heavy smokers.8
We rst discuss the implications of the case where @2h=@x@e > 0. With this property,
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose that sin goods and health care are complements. If Hi  Ci , the
optimal sin tax is always positive. If Hi < 
C
i , the optimal sin tax is uncertain in sign,
which implies that it may be optimal to subsidize sin goods.
Proof. If individuals su¤er more from myopia concerning health quality, i.e., Hi < 
C
i , we
have emi < e
. Given that sin goods and health care are complements, i.e., @2h=@x@e > 0,
we can further infer that @h
@x
(x; emi ) <
@h
@x
(x; e). Thus the sign of (13b) is ambiguous
(notice that @h=@x is negative). By contrast, if Hi  Ci then emi  e, meaning that
@h
@x
(x; emi )  @h@x(x; e) in the case of complements. Thus, given that Hi 2 (0; ], the
optimal sin tax is always positive.
We will illustrate the validity of Proposition 2 in Section 4.1 using a numerical example.
The intuition behind the possible optimality of a negative sin tax is interpreted as follows. A
greater degree of myopia regarding health quality has two opposite e¤ects on the choice of sin-
good consumption. On the one hand, when the degree of myopia concerning health quality is
present, individuals underestimate the marginal damage caused by sin goods, leading to over-
consumption of the sin goods. This direct e¤ect entails a positive tax rate on sin goods. On
the other hand, when the degree of myopia regarding health quality is stronger, individuals
will plan a suboptimally low level of health expenditure in the rst period (Lemma 3). At
the same time, the choice of sin-good consumption is associated with the suboptimally low
emi . Given that sin goods and health care are complements (@
2h=@x@e > 0), individuals
with a lower emi overestimate the marginal damage of sin goods. As a result, they tend
to consume fewer sin goods compared to the optimal level. This indirect e¤ect calls for a
subsidy on sin goods. If the indirect e¤ect dominates the direct e¤ect, subsidizing sin goods
is favorable.
8These cases are well discussed in Cremer et al. (2012).
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We next investigate the implications of the case @2h=@x@e < 0. The result is stated in
the next proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose that sin goods and health care are substitutes. If Hi  Ci , the
optimal sin tax is always positive. If Hi > 
C
i , the optimal sin tax is uncertain in sign,
which implies that it may be optimal to subsidize sin goods.
Proof. If individuals su¤er more frommyopia concerning future consumption, i.e., Hi > 
C
i ,
we have emi > e
. Given that sin goods and health care are substitutes, i.e., @2h=@x@e < 0,
we can further infer that @h
@x
(x; emi ) <
@h
@x
(x; e). Thus the sign of (13b) is ambiguous. By
contrast, if Hi  Ci then emi  e, meaning that @h@x(x; emi )  @h@x(x; e) in the case of
substitutes. Thus, given that Hi 2 (0; ], the optimal sin tax is always positive.
The intuition is parallel to the above discussion regarding Proposition 2. The direct
e¤ect is the same, while the indirect e¤ect is opposite due to the di¤erent sign of the cross-
derivative. When the degree of myopia concerning future consumption is stronger, Lemma 3
says that individuals plan to invest in a too highlevel of health care. In the case where sin
goods and health care are substitutes (@2h=@x@e < 0), the synchronized choice of the level
of sin-good consumption is reduced because individuals overestimate the marginal damage
caused by sin goods with a too high emi . Again, if this indirect e¤ect outweighs the direct
e¤ect, it is optimal to subsidize sin goods.
4.1 A numerical example
In this subsection we provide a simple numerical analysis to illustrate how the sign of the
optimal sin tax hinges on the substitutability between x and e, and the degree of myopia.
The main purpose here is not to provide a comprehensive quantitative evaluation on the level
of optimal sin tax, but to highlight the possibility of a negative optimal sin tax by using a
computational example. In doing so, we rst assign an explicit form on equation (6), given
by:
Ui = ln ci +  lnxi + 
C
i ln di + 
H
i e
x : (6)
For simplicity, in equation (6) we consider a logarithmic utility function both for numeraire
goods and sin goods. The health quality function is specied as h(e; x) = ex . The
parameters  and  reect respectively the preference for sin goods and health quality. We
then consider the following parameter values. The true discount factor is set as  = 0:95,
and the preference for sin goods is chosen as  = 2 based on the observation that sin goods
usually give higher immediate utility than other goods. For the case of substitutes between
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sin goods and health care, we use the set of parameter values (; ; ; y) = (0:5; 0:5; 1:5; 2);
for the case of complements we use (; ; ; y) = ( 0:5; 1; 1:1; 1). As an illustrative
example, we choose these parameter values such that the ratio of sinful consumption to
income is around 25%.9 These values satisfy the properties of the health quality function we
mentioned in Section 2. Lastly, to highlight the role of myopia over future consumption, we
x the degree of myopia concerning health quality as H = 0:8, and vary C to see how the
optimal sin tax responds.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here]
Figures 1 and 2 show the e¤ect of varying C on the optimal sin tax. In the case of
substitutes, the optimal sin tax decreases when the problem of myopia concerning future
consumption becomes more serious (i.e., with a smaller C). As C is smaller than 0.66,
the optimal policy is to subsidize sin goods. By contrast, in the case of complements, the
optimal sin tax decreases when the problem of myopia concerning future consumption is
mild (i.e., with a larger C). The optimal sin tax is negative as C exceeds around 0.92. As
is obvious, the numerical results manifest the validity of our analytical results reported in
Propositions 2 and 3.
5 Comparison of Sin Taxes
In this section we compare the optimal sin taxes under the two characteristics, persistent
error and dual self. In doing so we derive the di¤erence between (12b) and (13b):
Px;i   Dx;i =
Hi [
@h
@x
(x; e)  @h
@x
(x; emi )]
u0(c)
: (15)
Let us rst suppose that the degree of myopia regarding future consumption is greater
(Hi > 
C
i ). We thus have e
m
i > e
 from Lemma 3. Accordingly, the term @h
@x
(x; emi ) will be
larger (smaller) than @h
@x
(x; e) if sin goods and health care are complements (substitutes).
We can then infer that the optimal sin tax with persistent errors should be lower (higher) than
that with dual selves. The intuition is as follows. Due to the inconsistent levels of emi and
e, dual-self myopes are mistaken in evaluating the marginal damage of sin goods. The case
under consideration emi > e
 means that dual-self myopes plan too high a level of health care.
With this mistaken plan, they also underestimate the marginal damage caused by sin goods
in the case of complements, and thus consume more sin goods. Persistent-error myopes, on
9We consider a much broader concept of sin goods including consumption of alcohol, cigarettes, junk
foods, soft drinks, sugar, drugs, and so on.
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the contrary, are not disturbed by such an e¤ect, given that their rst-period choice of health
care has been corrected by the optimal Pe;i. Thus, to correct the additional underestimation
of the marginal damage of sin goods for dual-self myopes, the government should levy a
higher sin tax compared to that imposed on persistent-error myopes. Alternatively, in the
case of substitutes between sin goods and health care, emi > e
 implies an overestimation of
the damage caused by sin goods. As a result, the government should adopt a lower sin tax.
The logic for the case where the degree of myopia regarding health quality is greater
(Hi < 
C
i ) is the other side of the coin of the previous discussion. To conserve space, we
do not go through them again. The following proposition summarizes our ndings in this
section:
Proposition 4 (i) If Hi > 
C
i , the optimal sin tax with dual selves is higher (lower) than
that with persistent errors if sin goods and health care are complements (substitutes). (ii)
If Hi < 
C
i , the optimal sin tax with dual selves is higher (lower) than that with persistent
errors if sin goods and health care are substitutes (complements). (iii) If Hi = 
C
i , the
optimal sin taxes under the two characteristics are equivalent.
Proof. We rst prove the case Hi > 
C
i , which implies e
m
i > e
. If sin goods and
health care are complements, we can infer that @h
@x
(x; emi ) >
@h
@x
(x; e), and thus the sign of
(15) is negative. If sin goods and health care are substitutes, we can infer that @h
@x
(x; emi ) <
@h
@x
(x; e), and thus the sign of (15) is positive. The case Hi < 
C
i follows a similar inference.
In the case where Hi = 
C
i , we have
@h
@x
(x; emi ) =
@h
@x
(x; e). Accordingly, we can obtain
that Px;i = 
D
x;i.
6 Discussions
For simplicity, our analysis has made some assumptions that may be debatable in terms of
their realism. In this section, we provide extensive discussions on two crucial assumptions
and their implications.
6.1 Individualized policy
This paper considers two types of myopic agents, and the rst-best policies require indi-
vidualized treatment for these two types of individuals. In reality, however, individualized
policies face di¢ culties. First is about asymmetric information: the policymaker is usually
di¢ cult to distinguish between the two types of myopes. Moreover, even if the policymaker
has full information, it would be too costly to implement specic policies on each individual.
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Therefore, it can only impose a uniform policy that takes into consideration the behaviors of
both individuals. In this case, the rst-best optimum is not possible. To address this issue,
one needs to consider the second-best setting where only uniform taxes/subsidies are usable,
which is beyond the focus of this analysis. At this moment, the purpose of our theoretical
model, as other multiple-self models, shall be best viewed as aiming at highlighting specic
aspects of intertemporal choice (Frederick et al., 2002, p376) and understanding how policies
restore the rst-best optimum. A direct policy implication from our results is that the uni-
form policy should lean towards the individualized policy for one type of myope if such type
is more empirically observed. This implication further calls for empirical evidence to guide
us whether there are more persistent or dual-self individuals in the economy. However, the
empirical evidence in this respect is scarce.10 Future experiments can be designed to explore
this issue.
6.2 Absent sin goods in the second period
While people consume sin goods at all times, our model, along with many studies in this
literature, assumes that individuals only consume sin goods in their rst period. In addition
to technical simplicity, this setting has the advantage of sharpening our focus on the problem
of myopia that arises as individuals undervalue the delayed health consequence of sin goods.
A more general specication would be to consider sin goods consumed in both young and
old periods. In this case, the individualsobjective function would be given by:
Ui = u(ci) + v(xi) + 
C
i u(di) + 
X
i v(zi) + 
H
i h(xi; zi; ei): (16)
Here zi denotes the level of sin goods consumed in the second period, and Xi denotes the
degree of myopia concerning future sin goods. Notice that zi cannot have delayed health
costs because there are only two periods in this model. Thus equation (16) assumes that the
health cost of zi is realized within the period when it is consumed. A possible interpretation
of specication (16) is that the numeraire good and sin goods are consumed at the beginning
of the second period, while health quality is realized at the end of the second period.
A critical feature of this extension is that the choices of xi and zi are subject to di¤erent
myopia problems, i.e., Hi and 
X
i . Therefore, as long as the government imposes a at rate
of sin tax in both periods, the rst-best optimum is virtually unreachable.11 The intuition is
10The experiments designed for testing preferences with self-control problems mostly focus on exploring
the degree of peoples partial naivete; i.e., people are partially persistent-error and partially dual-self. Few
(if not none) have distinguished two types of myopes and to examine which type of myope is more. See
DellaVigna (2009) for a recent survey.
11A detailed proof is available from the authors upon request.
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briey explained as follows. In our basic model, there exist three distortions, and three policy
instruments are su¢ cient to decentralize the rst-best optimum (see our discussions below
Proposition 1). Now introducing sin goods in the second period adds another distortion into
the model. For persistent-error myopes, this implies that three policy instruments are not
adequate for decentralizing the rst-best optimum any more. For dual-self myopes, logically,
it is optimal to tax xi while leaving zi untaxed because the rational selveswill choose a
correct level of zi. Hence, a uniform sin tax on xi and zi makes it even harder to restore
the rst-best optimum. The comprehensive analysis of this extended model shall require
modifying the model in other dimensions, which we leave for future research.
7 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the rst-best policies on sin goods and health care in an economy
with myopic individuals. The previous literature on sin taxes mostly assumes that sin-good
consumers are myopic in the sense that they underestimate the health costs of sin goods. We
introduce another type of myopia into this literature; namely, individuals may underestimate
the utility of future consumption, which is an assumption normally adopted in the literature
on social security. Once this type of myopia is considered, the optimal policies could exhibit
di¤erent properties from previous results. For myopes who never regret, if they su¤er more
from the myopia concerning future consumption, we nd that it may be suboptimal to
subsidize health care. For myopes who will regret their earlier shortsighted choices, the
optimal sin tax depends on the interplay between the degrees of myopia and the property of
the health quality function. In some cases, the optimal sin tax is negative.
Most literature on sin taxes, including our paper, has focused primarily on the aspect of
internalities (Gruber and K½oszegi, 2001) imposed by sin-good consumers on themselves.
However, sinful consumption is sometimes accompanied by negative externalities. Generally,
if externalities are taken into account in the present framework, the social cost of sinful
consumption would be greater. As a consequence, a higher tax on sin goods is needed, and
therefore the conditions under which the optimal sin tax is negative would be more strict.
Although coming at the cost of complexity, introducing externalities of sin goods can provide
valuable insights to the literature.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 3
Combining (10c) and (10d), and inserting De;i = 0, we can rewrite the rst-order conditions
under the rst-best policy mix as:
u
0
[s   emi ] = u
0
[(d) + (e   emi )] =
Hi
Ci
@h
@e
(x; emi ): (A1)
Note that the rst-best condition of health care is:
u
0
(d) =
@h
@e
(x; e): (A2)
Now let us rst consider the case where Hi > 
C
i . According to (A1) we have u
0
[(d) +
(e   emi )] > @h@e (xi; emi ). Since u() and h() are strictly concave in d and e, it follows
that if e  emi , then u0 [(d) + (e   emi )]  u0(d) and @h@e (x; e)  @h@e (x; emi ) are true.
This means that u
0
[(d) + (e   emi )]  u0(d) = @h@e (x; e)  @h@e (x; emi ), which contradicts
u
0
[(d)+(e emi )] > @h@e (x; emi ). We can therefore conclude that if Hi > Ci , then e < emi
must hold.
Similarly, in the case where Hi < 
C
i , from (A1) we have u
0
[(d) + (e   emi )] <
@h
@e
(x; emi ). If e
  emi , then u0 [(d) + (e   emi )]  u0(d) and @h@e (x; e)  @h@e (x; emi ) are
true, implying that u
0
[(d) + (e  emi )]  u0(d) = @h@e (x; e)  @h@e (x; emi ):This contradicts
u
0
[(d) + (e   emi )] < @h@e (x; emi ). Thus we can infer that if Hi < Ci , then e > emi .
Lastly, in the case where Hi = 
C
i , it is straightforward to see that u
0
(d) = @h
@e
(x; emi ).
Thus the condition (A2) holds if and only if @h
@e
(x; e) = @h
@e
(x; emi ), that is, e
 = emi . 
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 Figure 1: The case of substitutes between x and e 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The case of complements between x and e 
 
